NJ Business Law Blog

May Corporate Actors Be Held Personally Liable Under the Consumer Fraud Act?

In Allen v. V&A Brothers, Inc, A-30 SEPT.TERM 2010, 2011 WL 2637270 (N.J. July 7, 2011), the Court considered whether an individual could have personal liability for a violation of the the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) by his company. In that case, the Allens hired V&A Brothers to build a pool and later discovered the workmanship was defective.  Id. In response, the Allens filed several claims against the vendor. One alleged a violation of the CFA for failure to execute a written contract.

The reason that failure was significant was that the CFA requires “[a]ll home improvement contracts for a purchase price in excess of $500.00, and all changes in the terms and conditions thereof [to] be in writing.” N.J.S.A. 13:45A-16.2.  In Allen, there was no written contract at all.  Id.  Due to the failure to satisfy this requirement of the CFA, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the lower court’s ruling and held that a corporation’s principal officers as well as their employees may be held personally liable under the CFA. Id. As a result, the corporate officers were liable for $390,000 in CFA damages, so long as the individual played a part in breaking the rules. Therefore, generally speaking, principals, who are the policy-setters for an organization, carry a greater exposure to personal liability than do employees.

In light of this decision, individuals associated with an entity that violates the CFA may be held liable even though the CFA claim is based only on a rule violation (such as a failure to provide a written contract) rather than actual fraud.

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When Are Non-Solicitation Covenants in an Employment Agreement Enforceable?

A recent case offers guidance to New York employers concerning their ability to restrict former employees from attempting to take away the employer’s customers. 

In that case, a former employee of USI Insurance Services, LLC (“USI”) signed an employment agreement that included a provision restricting the employee’s ability to solicit the business of former clients for 24 months following the termination of the agreement.  USI Insurance Services LLC v. Miner, No. 10 Civ. 8162, 2011 WL 2848139 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011). Yet just days after the the employee, Jeffrey Miner, left the company and triggered the termination of the employment agreement, he mass e-mailed USI’s current customers in an attempt to solicit business.  In this case, the U.S. Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York Court concluded that Miner’s actions constituted solicitation as a matter of law and granted partial summary judgment to USI on this issue. Id. at 13. Miner’s mass e-mail to USI’s current customers was a clear attempt to solicit business in violation of the employer’s contractual rights. Therefore, it was prohibited conduct.

In New York, non-solicitation covenants – also known as restrictive covenants – are provisions in an agreement that restrict others from actively engaging in certain business development activities (i.e. soliciting an employer’s customers). A non-solicitation covenant may restrict a former employee from contacting his employer’s customers by way of mailings, e-mails, personal calls or through other means that would constitute solicitation.  Id. at 11. According to the Court, non-solicitation covenants are enforceable if they are:

a)      necessary to prevent disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, or

b)      where an employee’s services are unique or extraordinary.

Id.

Additionally, the covenants cannot impose undue hardship on the employee or be injurious to the public. Id. at 14 [quoting IBM Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399, 2011 WL 672025, 8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011)]. 

However, a non-solicitation covenant alone may not be enough to restrict a former employee from taking customers. In an unrelated case, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “‘absent an express or restrictive covenant not to compete,’ advertising to the general public . . . [would] not be considered solicitation, so long as such advertisements are not specifically aimed at the seller’s former clients.” Id. at 12 [quoting Bessemer Trust Co. v. Branin, 2011 WL 1583932, 5 (N.Y. Ct. of Appeals Apr. 28, 2011]. Accordingly, a former employee can continue to compete in the same industry.  Id.  Also, a customer can contact his former employee for the purposes of obtaining factual information and such interaction would also be permissible “so long as the response .  .  . [does] not go beyond the specific information sought.”  Id.

This is a significant decision for companies that are including non-solicitation covenants in their employment agreements. The Court’s decision gives an indication of what type of covenant would be reasonable to be enforced. 

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When Is a Collection Letter a Misleading Demand For Payment?

In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that an offer to settle a debt can include an optional payment date that falls within the time in which the consumer can dispute the debt. It may do so as long as the offer is not deceptive. D’Addario v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77682 (D.N.J. July 14, 2011).

The defendant in the case, Enhanced Recovery Co. (“Enhanced Recovery”), sent a letter dated October 15, 2010 to the plaintiff, Adam D’Addario (“D’Addario”). The letter offered D’Addario a repayment opportunity on an $8,744.70 debt that he owed to Chrysler Financial, LLC. The first of several options offered in the letter stated “Option 1: Settlement: $3,497.88, please remit by 10/30/10.” Id. at 2. The letter also notified the reader to “see reverse side for important notices and consumer rights.” Id. One of the rights granted to D’Addario was his right to dispute the debt within thirty days of receiving the letter.

D’Addario claimed that, because the deadline for payment fell within the time period in which he could have disputed the debt, Enhanced Recovery’s letter was a “misleading and inaccurate” “demand” for payment. Id. at 3. As such, he alleged the letter violated the Fair Debt Collections Practice (the “FDCPA”). 15 U.S.C. § 1692.  Enhanced Recovery moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The FDCPA states that “[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Id. at § 1692(e). A communication is determined to be deceptive for the purposes of the FDCPA if:

1)      It can be reasonably read to have two different meanings

2)      One of which is inaccurate.

Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008).

When determining a communication is deceptive, the Court is required to adopt the perspective of “the least sophisticated debtor,” which is “less demanding than one that inquires whether a particular debt collection communication would mislead or deceive a reasonable debtor.” D’Addario at 5, 6.

Even when viewing the issue from this lower standard, the Court disagreed with D’Addario’s argument that the letter was misleading. It held that nothing in the statute prohibited settlement of the debt within the validation period. Additionally, “even the least sophisticated debtor could not believe that the letter presented him with an ‘either/or’ proposition – i.e., either dispute the debt’s validity or pay off the debt, but not both.” Id. at 7.  The letter did not emphasize one option over the other. Id. The Court also noted that the letter contained no threats or demands and did “not even suggest the possibility of legal action on the debt.” Id. at 8.

The Court’s decision is significant for debt collectors who offer consumers various settlement offers and sheds light on the language that courts will generally permit in such documents.

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When Can a Plaintiff Pierce the Corporate Veil of a Limited Partnership?

New Jersey might be joining a group of states that have decided to allow plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil of limited partnerships, but the state’s courts would only allow it in limited circumstances.

A limited partner is one who does not insinuate himself in the running of the partnership, and is therefore, not jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of the other partners. However, in a matter of first impression, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey recently held that a plaintiff would be able to pierce the corporate veil of a limited partner in certain situations, including when that partner dominated the partnership or used it to perpetuate a fraud or injustice. Canter v. Lakewood, 420 N.J.Super. 508, 22 A.3d 68.

The suit arose when the plaintiff, Sanford Canter, broke his leg during a slip-and-fall at Lakewood at Vorhees (“Lakewood”) nursing home, where he was a resident. The defendants named in the negligence suit included Seniors Healthcare, Inc. (“SHI”) and Ozal of Lakewood (“Ozal”), each a limited partner of Lakewood. Carter asserted that, in addition to Lakewood, the limited partners of the nursing home should also be liable.

While generally a limited partner is shielded from liability for the partnership’s obligations, the New Jersey Statutes set forth that the two exceptions to this rule:

a)      a limited partner is also a general partner, or

b)      a limited partner participates in the control of the business.

N.J.S.A. 42:2A-27a.

Nevertheless, N.J.S.A. 42:2A-27b’s “safe harbor” provision allows a limited partner to engage in certain activities of the partnership without being considered in control of the business. Those safe harbor activities include being a shareholder of a general partner; consulting or advising with a general partner; or being the partnership’s contractor, agent or employee.

However, the Canter Court held that a limited partner may also be found liable when the partner “dominates” the partnership or uses it to commit a fraud or injustice. Factors that are considered during this determination of “domination” include:

a)      the limited partner’s role in day-to-day operations of a business

b)      the limited partner’s decision-making authority compared to that of a general partner

c)      Capitalization of the entity relative to the nature of the company’s business

SHI argued that veil piercing did not apply to a limited partnership and, even if it did, that SHI did not dominate Lakewood or use it to perpetuate a fraud or injustice. The Court agreed with SHI’s second argument, stating that “corporate veil-piercing principles can apply to a limited partnership; however, the record does not support veil piercing in this case.”

The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and granted SHI’s motion for summary judgment, finding no evidence that it had dominated Lakewood or used its control in the company to perpetuate any fraud. The Court’s decision aligns New Jersey law with that of other states who have adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. It is significant  because it provides a framework for courts to use when determining whether to pierce the shield of a limited partner.    

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Are you Pro Choice (of Law) in Your Contracts?

One of the most common mistakes business people make when reading a contract is to overlook the Choice of Law clause. While this may sound like a mere technicality, in fact, it is critical to the contract’s enforcement.

A Choice of Law contract clause states that the agreement will be enforced under the law of a particular state. That is especially important when the state in which the contract was entered into is not readily apparent. For example, what if someone in Pennsylvania signs an employment contract with a company based in California. And what if that person will work out of a satellite office in New York? It is not clear which state’s law would apply. That is a major problem if, for example, the restrictive covenant in that contract is enforced to bar the employee from working in the industry for a certain period of time. The law of California is radically different than the law of New York or Pennsylvania in this regard. California is notoriously hostile toward restrictive covenants.

Interestingly, the Choice of Law Clause is generally binding regardless of the state in which the Court hearing the dispute is sitting. So, in our example, the contract might say that New York law applies, yet the suit might be instituted in Pennsylvania since that is where the former employee resides and has assets subject to collection in the event a judgment is entered. In such a case, the Pennsylvania court would enforce New York law.

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May a law firm advertise with a picture that includes a potential defendant’s trademarked logo?

The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”) of Philadelphia, recently sued the Philadelphia law firm of Mednick, Mezyk & Kredo (the “firm”) for trademark infringement over the firm’s use of a SEPTA bus on its website and for its telephone number, which contained the word “SEPTA.”

The reason the law firm wanted to use the SEPTA logo was that the law firm’s practice focused on lawsuits against SEPTA. In fact, the law firm’s phone number was 888-SEPTA-LAW. Their website was myseptalawyer.com.

According to SEPTA, the firm’s use of both the “SEPTA” logo and the red and blue stylized “S” mark in its advertising was infringing upon SEPTA’s registered trademark.  The lawsuit also alleged that the firm advertised in Philadelphia newspapers using SEPTA’s colors in addition to its trademarks.  The firm’s website displayed an image of a bus displaying the SEPTA trademarks that SEPTA argued was virtually identical to an image of a SEPTA bus.  Thus, SEPTA argued that the firm’s use of the trademarks was identical to SEPTA’s use of the trademarks in violation of the law.  Prior to filing suit, SEPTA sent the firm a cease and desist letter. 

In response to the cease and desist letter, the firm denied that it was infringing on SEPTA’s trademarks and continued to use the website and telephone number.  After filing suit, SEPTA argued that the firm’s continued use of the trademarks constituted bad faith and continued and willful infringement.  SEPTA alleged in its complaint that the firm’s use of SEPTA’s trademarks had, or was likely to, cause confusion in the minds of consumers as to the origin of the firm’s services and/or its possible affiliation with SEPTA.  SEPTA claimed that the firm’s actions caused damage to its goodwill and reputation.

The firm took the position that its use of the trademarks constituted a fair use under the law and that there was little chance people would confuse personal injury lawyers representing victims hurt on SEPTA property with lawyers employed by SEPTA.  Despite taking that position, the firm ultimately settled the lawsuit with SEPTA, agreeing to remove its website and change its telephone number.  In exchange, SEPTA agreed to a transition period during which the firm may change over its website and telephone number.

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May the State of New Jersey require merchants to collect zip code information from purchasers of gift cards?

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey was recently asked to determine whether to uphold a New Jersey law requiring merchants to collect zip code information from purchasers of gift cards – which are also known as “stored value cards” (“SVC”).  New Jersey Retail Merch. Assoc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, No. 10-5059. The purpose of collecting this information was to establish that the card was purchased in New Jersey. Having established that, if the card were not redeemed within a certain period, it would become the property of the State of New Jersey by the legal principle known as, escheat.

A group of plaintiffs led by the New Jersey Retail Merchants Association sued Andrew Sidamon-Eristoff, the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey on the grounds that the law placed an unfair burden on merchants.  The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order preventing the State from enforcing the portion of the law requiring merchants to collect zip code information from purchaser of SVCs at the time of sale (the “data collection provision”).  A different portion of the law – which presumed that if no zip code information was available, the presumption would be that it was purchased in New Jersey (the “place-of-purchase presumption”) – was held unconstitutional by the same District Court in an earlier proceeding.  The plaintiffs argued that the data collection provision was similarly unconstitutional on the grounds that it was so interrelated to the place-of-purchase presumption that the two could not be severed.

The District Court held that the requirement to obtain zip code information was “entirely independent from what presumption is applied when no zip code is actually obtained, and the place-of-purchase presumption is applied.”  Id. at *11.  The court reasoned that removing the place-of-purchase presumption placed the focus on the residence of the purchaser/owner of the SVC rather than on the location where the SVC was purchased.  The court also reasoned that upholding the data collection provision furthered the objective of the law, which was to reunite purchasers/owners with their abandoned property.  The court determined that the collection of zip code information assisted in fulfilling that objective.

The District Court also examined decisions of the United States Supreme Court and determined that the Supreme Court consistently held that it is the purchaser’s last known address that determines which state has the right to “escheat” – acquire title to property for which there is no owner – and “the data collection provision focuses on that key location.”  Id. at *16.  The District Court noted that in the cases it analyzed, the Supreme Court refused to permit other states – such as Pennsylvania and Delaware – to presume that all property purchased in the state had been purchased by a state resident even when no address was on record.  The Supreme Court created a method to govern the escheat of intangible property by creating the Texas priority scheme, beginning with its decision in Texas v. New Jersey, 85 S.Ct. 626 (1965). 

The Texas priority scheme has two rules.  The “primary rule” states that, “the right and power to escheat the debt should be accorded to the State of the creditor’s last known address as shown by the debtor’s books and records.”  The “secondary rule” states that, “where the creditor’s last known address is unknown, or where the last known address is in a state that does not provide for the escheat of the abandoned property . . .  the right to escheat [goes] to the debtor’s State of corporate domicile.”  Per the court, the Texas line of cases clearly authorized states to require issuers of intangible property to collect the last known address of the purchaser and to rely on that address in reuniting the purchaser with her abandoned property.

In conclusion, the District Court held that the data collection provision was entirely severable from the place-of-purchase presumption and that there was no interdependence between the two provisions.  The District Court also held that “collection of the purchaser’s last known address has been sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court and is integral to the Texas priority scheme.”  Id. at *17.  As a result, the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order.

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May a court stop someone from starting a new job when they are accused of stealing trade secrets from their old job?

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was recently asked to prevent an individual from starting a new job after he was accused of stealing trade secrets from his old job.  Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-1510, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010).

Chris Botticella was employed as Vice President of Operations for Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. (“Bimbo”) from 2001 to January 2010.  In early 2009, he signed a “Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Invention Assignment Agreement” (the “Agreement”) with Bimbo.  Bimbo claimed that he possessed a broad range of confidential information about Bimbo, its products and its business strategy; including the secret behind the “nooks and crannies” of Thomas’ English Muffins.  The Agreement restricted Botticella from competing directly with Bimbo, prevented him from disclosing confidential or proprietary information and required him to return to Bimbo every work-related document in his possession upon termination of his employment.  The Agreement did not include a restriction on where Botticella could work if he left Bimbo.

In October 2009, Botticella accepted a job with Hostess Brands, Inc. (“Hostess”).  He did not immediately tell Bimbo about this new position, so he continued receiving confidential and proprietary information from Bimbo.  Hostess made Botticella sign an “Acknowledgment and Representation Form” (“Form”) before he began working there.  The Form stated that Hostess was not interested in any confidential information, proprietary information or trade secrets that Botticella obtained from Bimbo.  The Form also prevented Botticella from disclosing any such information to Hostess.  Botticella gave Bimbo notice of his resignation on January 4, 2010 and he was officially terminated by Bimbo on January 13, 2010.

Bimbo sued Botticella after he began working for Hostess and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent him from working there.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Bimbo’s request for a preliminary injunction.  That injunction prohibited Botticella from working for Hostess; from divulging to Hostess any of Bimbo’s confidential or proprietary information; and directed him to return any confidential or proprietary information in his possession to Bimbo.  Botticella appealed the District Court’s decision and all proceedings were stayed while the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard the case.

The Third Circuit reviewed Pennsylvania law and determined that the District Court properly exercised its discretion in preventing Botticella from working for Hostess if it believed there was a threat he would expose Bimbo’s trade secrets.  The Third Circuit also determined that the District Court made the proper inquiry when deciding whether to grant the injunction, which is: “whether there is sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat of a defendant disclosing trade secrets.”  Id. at 26.

The Third Circuit held that Botticella’s position with Hostess was substantially similar to his position with Bimbo.  The record supported that conclusion since Botticella’s position with Hostess would involve broad oversight over bakery operations, just like his position with Bimbo.  The Third Circuit also agreed that the evidence supported the conclusion that Botticella intended to use Bimbo’s trade secrets while employed with Hostess.  This evidence included Botticella’s failure to immediately disclose his acceptance of a job from a direct competitor which permitted him to remain in a position to receive Bimbo’s confidential information.  The evidence also showed that Botticella received confidential information after accepting the Hostess job and that he copied Bimbo’s trade secret information from his work laptop onto external storage devices.  As a result, the Third Circuit concluded that Bimbo was likely to succeed against Botticella on its claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.

The Third Circuit similarly held that Bimbo would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction because disclosure of its trade secrets to Hostess would put it at a competitive disadvantage.  The Third Circuit also held that the potential harm to Botticella was outweighed by the potential harm to Bimbo and agreed that an injunction was warranted and the restraint necessary to prevent greater irreparable harm from befalling Hostess.

The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that granting the injunction was consistent with the public interest.  The Third Circuit was “satisfied on the facts of this case that the public interest in preventing the misappropriation of Bimbo’s trade secrets outweighs the temporary restriction on Botticella’s choice of employment.”  Id. at 38. 

In conclusion, the Third Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction issued in favor of Bimbo which prevented Botticella from continuing to work with Hostess.  The case was remanded to the District Court with the injunction in place for a trial on whether Botticella actually misappropriated Bimbo’s trade secrets.

Download Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-1510, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010)

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Can an employee copy her employer’s confidential documents to support the employee’s claim of gender discrimination?

In a case of first impression, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently decided that an employee may copy confidential company documents to support the employee’s claim of gender discrimination. The Court found that this was activity protected by New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 42.

 

The company in question, Curtiss-Wright Corp., promoted a male employee with less experience and qualification than the plaintiff, Joyce Quinlan. She claimed she was passed over because of gender discrimination.  Afterward, she copied numerous confidential company documents, the most damaging of which was a performance appraisal of the male employee that stated he needed to improve his job performance in several areas.  Ms. Quinlan believed the appraisal supported her claims and immediately provided it to her attorney.

 

Upon learning that she had copied the performance appraisal, Curtiss-Wright fired her for being “a thief.”  She sued the company in the Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey for gender discrimination and retaliation.  A trial was held and the jury found that her actions in copying the performance appraisal were protected by the LAD and that the company had engaged in unlawful retaliation by firing her.

 

The case was appealed, and the jury’s verdict was overturned by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.  Thereafter, New Jersey’s Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.  Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 204 N.J. 239 (2010).

 

The Supreme Court established seven factors to be considered in determining whether such activity is protected.  Those factors are: 1) how the employee came into possession of the documents; 2) what the employee did with the documents; 3) the nature and content of the documents to assess the employer’s interest in keeping the documents confidential; 4) whether the company had a clearly identified policy on privacy or confidentiality that the employee violated; 5) whether the use or disclosure of the documents was unduly disruptive to the company’s business; 6) the strength of the employee’s expressed reason for copying the documents, rather than describing them or identifying them to counsel; and 7) the effect permitting or prohibiting the use of the documents will have on the balance of rights generally between employees and employers.

 

The Supreme Court held that these factors weighed in favor of Ms. Quinlan. Copying the performance appraisal was protected by the LAD. The Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict in her favor. 

 

The Court did not establish a general rule that such copying of confidential documents will always be protected by the LAD.  Instead, the Court stated that the seven factors it established were to be applied on a case-by-case basis.

 

Download Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 204 N.J. 239 (2010)

 

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Does a local ordinance prohibiting the display of inflated signs violate the First Amendment?

The Supreme Court of New Jersey was asked to determine whether a Lawrence Township ordinance prohibiting the display of balloons or inflated signs – except in very limited circumstances – violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment.  State v. DeAngelo, 197 N.J. 478 (2009).

The ordinance in question prohibited portable signs, balloon signs or other inflated signs, but excepted grand opening signs.  During union activity at a Gold’s Gym in Lawrence Township in 2005 a ten-foot-tall inflatable rat-shaped balloon – which has long been the symbol of union unrest – was displayed on the sidewalk in front of the location.  The union was protesting the presence of a non-union contractor working in the gym.  Police officers initially instructed the union members to deflate the rat and they did.  Officers returned approximately one-hour later and saw that the rat was re-inflated.  As a result, officers gave Wayne DeAngelo, the union official in charge of the demonstration, a summons after he admitted re-inflating the balloon.  DeAngelo was found guilty of violating the ordinance by the Municipal Court of Lawrence Township and ordered to pay a fine.

DeAngelo appealed the decision of the Municipal Court to the Law Division of the Superior Court.  A trial was held before the Law Division which held that DeAngelo violated the ordinance.  DeAngelo appealed that decision to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.  The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Law Division that DeAngelo violated the ordinance and should pay a fine.  DeAngelo appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which agreed to hear the case to decide the free speech issue.

New Jersey’s Supreme Court held that the ordinance was content-based because it prohibited a union from displaying a rat balloon while permitting a similar display as part of a grand opening.  Under the ordinance, whether such a sign is authorized “is justified only by reference to the person or entity displaying the sign.”  Id. at p. 488.  The ordinance also favored commercial over non-commercial speech and, “because the ordinance is based on the purpose for which the sign is displayed,” the ordinance is content-based.  Id.

The Court held that there was no evidence that a rat balloon was more harmful to aesthetics or safety than a similar item displayed as an advertisement for a seven-day grand opening promotion.  There was also no evidence that the ordinance was “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”  Id. at 489.

The Court also held that the ordinance was overbroad because it prohibited a “substantial amount of protected speech.”  Id.  An ordinance that prohibits an entire medium of expression “will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.”  Id. at 490.  Lawrence Township’s ordinance virtually eliminated all signs except for grand openings of businesses and other minor exceptions.  Its “elimination of an entire medium of expression without a readily available alternative renders the ordinance overbroad.”  Id. at 491.

Thus, the Court held that the ordinance violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced.  As a result, DeAngelo’s conviction for violating the ordinance was overturned and the case remanded to the Law Division for dismissal of the summons issued to DeAngelo.

Download State v. DeAngelo, 396 N.J. Super. 23 (2007)

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